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Long-endurance human spaceflight – such as missions to Mars or its moons – will present
a never-before-seen maintenance logistics challenge. Crews will be in space for longer and
be farther way from Earth than ever before. Resupply and abort options will be heavily
constrained, and will have timescales much longer than current and past experience. Spare
parts and/or redundant systems will have to be included to reduce risk. However, the high
cost of transportation means that this risk reduction must be achieved while also minimizing
mass. The concept of increasing system and component reliability is commonly discussed as
a means to reduce risk and mass by reducing the probability that components will fail during
a mission. While increased reliability can reduce maintenance logistics mass requirements,
the rate of mass reduction decreases over time. In addition, reliability growth requires
increased test time and cost. This paper assesses trends in test time requirements, cost, and
maintenance logistics mass savings as a function of increase in Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF) for some or all of the components in a system. In general, reliability growth results
in superlinear growth in test time requirements, exponential growth in cost, and sublinear
benefits (in terms of logistics mass saved). These trends indicate that it is unlikely that
reliability growth alone will be a cost-effective approach to maintenance logistics mass
reduction and risk mitigation for long-endurance missions. This paper discusses these
trends as well as other options to reduce logistics mass such as direct reduction of part mass,
commonality, or In-Space Manufacturing (ISM). Overall, it is likely that some combination
of all available options – including reliability growth – will be required to reduce mass and
mitigate risk for future deep space missions.
Nomenclature
α Reliability growth rate
β Logistics mass savings growth rate (representative)
γ Reliability growth function scale parameter
λ Failure rate
ρ(t) Instantaneous failure rate at time t
c Cost
C(t) Cumulative average failure rate at time t
f Feasibility of increasing reliability
FEF Mean Fix Effectiveness Factor
MTBFG Goal Mean Time Between Failures
MTBFGP Reliability growth potential
η Multiplier on Mean Time Between Failures
nˆ Number of spares or redundant items provided
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n Total number of items provided (initial plus spares)
N(t) Number of failures observed up to time t
R(t) Reliability at time t
Rmax Maximum achievable reliability
Rmin Initial/Minimum reliability
t Time
AES Advanced Exploration Systems
AMSAA Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
DoD Department of Defense
DSH Deep Space Habitat
ECLS Environmental Control and Life Support
EMC Evolvable Mars Campaign
FEF Fix Effectiveness Factor
HEOMD Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate
ISM In-Space Manufacturing
ISRU In-Situ Resource Utilization
ISS International Space Station
LEO Low Earth Orbit
MS Management Strategy
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
NHPP Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit
P(LoC) Probability of Loss of Crew
POS Probability of Sufficiency
I. Introduction
Fsuture missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) will see humans go farther from home than ever before,and stay in space for a significantly longer amount of time. These missions will have severe constraints on
resupply or abort options, and in some cases crews may not have an option for a timely abort back to Earth
in the case of an emergency. As a result of these constraints, the criticality of maintenance capability is
increased, since a failure that might provide enough time to return to Earth in a LEO mission context could
prove catastrophic if no return is possible. Therefore, mission planning and system design must provide a
very high probability that required spacecraft functions will be available for the full duration of the mission.
This availability may be achieved through several means, including systems composed of highly reliable
components, added redundancy, design for maintainability, or contingency options. Given the high cost
associated with transporting materials from Earth to destinations beyond LEO, this high level of confidence
must be achieved while minimizing the total mass of the system.1–4
The concept of increasing the reliability of systems is commonly discussed as a means to reduce risk and
mass by decreasing the probability that components or subsystems will fail during a mission and therefore
reducing the number of redundant elements or spare parts that need to be carried in order to achieve a
desired probability of success.3 While increased reliability can have a positive impact on the supportability
of a mission, the scale of reliability growth required for long-duration missions can be extreme, and increases
exponentially as higher levels of mission confidence are desired. For repairable systems, the reduction in
spares mass achieved as a function of increased reliability has diminishing returns, and is small if only a
subset of components is affected. In addition, the cost of increasing reliability grows exponentially, and
significant test and operations time may be required to verify high reliability.5–7 As a result, high reliability
systems may be very expensive to achieve (both in terms of financial cost and development time) and
reliability alone may not be a cost-effective means to achieve high confidence in long-duration systems.7,8
This paper presents a sensitivity analysis of the risk and logistics mass associated with Deep Space Habi-
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tat (DSH) critical systems for a Mars transit mission. Section II presents background and definitions for
reliability and endurance and discusses the maintenance logistics challenges of long-endurance human space-
flight. Section III examines the relationship between cost, test time, and component reliability, discussing
various models and examining trends. Section IV examines the benefits of increased reliability in terms of
maintenance logistics mass reduction. Section V discusses these results; potential alternative approaches to
system supportability that may provide more robust systems – such as commonality, In-Space Manufactur-
ing (ISM), and lower level repair – are discussed along with the implications of these results with regard to
system design for long-endurance missions. Finally, section VI presents conclusions.
II. Reliability Challenges for Long-Endurance Missions
A. Background and Definitions
1. Reliability
Reliability is defined as the probability that an item will perform its intended function for a given period
of time under a given set of operating conditions.6 Reliability for a particular item is often characterized
using the constant failure rate model, which assumes that failures are stochastic events that occur at some
constant rate, known as the failure rate, λ.9 The inverse of failure rate is Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF), or the average amount of time between failure events. Importantly, failure rate and MTBF for
a particular item are parameters that describe a random variable – the amount of time that the item will
function – and are not parameters that can be used deterministically to determine how many times an item
will fail. In the constant failure rate model, the time to failure is characterized by an exponential distribution,
and the reliability R(t) (i.e. the probability that an item with failure rate λ will still be functional after
some time t) is the complement of the exponential Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF):
R(t)=e−λt=e
−t
MTBF (1)
Equation 1 illustrates the pitfalls of using MTBF as a deterministic parameter: if MTBF is equal to the
mission time t, the probability that the item will still be functioning is just under 0.37. In order to achieve
a high probability that an item will not fail over a given amount of time, the MTBF for that item must be
significantly greater than the operating time period.
When multiple failure and repair or switchover events are considered (i.e. if the system includes redun-
dancy or spare parts), the probability that a given number of failures will be experienced is given by the
CDF of the Poisson distribution, which models the number of times a random event with a constant rate
will occur within a given time period.10 For allocation of spare parts or redundant units to account for
potential failures, a key metric here is Probability of Sufficiency (POS), or the probability that the number
of replacement items provided is greater than the number of failures that will occur.11 When items fail at a
constant rate, POS is given by the CDF of the Poisson distribution:11
POS(n, t)=
nˆ∑
k=0
e−λt
(λt)k
k!
(2)
where nˆ is the number of spares (or off line redundant items) provided. This is one less than the total number
of items provided, n, which includes the initially installed item. Equations 1 and 2 can be used to assess the
reliability of an item (or system of items) with a given failure rate or MTBF over a given period of time.
2. Endurance
One of the most commonly used descriptor for the amount of time associated with a given mission is
duration, which refers to the time between the start and end of the mission. However, it is important to
distinguish between duration and endurance, which is defined as the amount of time that a system must
function without resupply.12 When a mission has no resupply, duration and endurance are equivalent. This
has been the case with most human spaceflight experience (e.g. Apollo, Shuttle). However, when periodic
resupply is available the endurance of a mission may be significantly shorter than its duration. This is the
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case with the International Space Station (ISS) – even though humans have continuously occupied the station
for more than a decade and a half, the ISS is resupplied from the ground approximately every 3 months. As
a result, while the ISS is a long-duration human spaceflight system, it is not a long-endurance system. No
human spaceflight experience has been gained on the endurances required for a mission to Mars and back.
This distinction is important for maintenance forecasting, since mission endurance represents the planning
horizon that reliability, maintenance logistics, and risk must be assessed over. This is particularly important
when no quick abort options will be available, as is the case for missions to Mars. Under these conditions, a
system failure that cannot be repaired could result in loss of function that leads to loss of crew; therefore, the
maintenance logistics provided and system reliability achieved are direct contributors to Probability of Loss
of Crew (P(LoC)). More precisely, the overall POS for critical systems – a function of the number of spares or
level of redundancy provided and the failure rate or MTBF achieved for each item – provides a bound on the
achievable P(LoC) for a given mission, which can be thought of as the maintenance logistics contribution to
P(LoC).13,14 While reliability calculations involving duration are important for system operations planning
even when resupply is available, when examining the risk of insufficient spares as it pertains to P(LoC).
B. Reliability and Risk for Deep Space
Future crewed exploration missions will be a reliability challenge unlike any previous human spaceflight
experience. Past experience – including expeditions to the moon and back during Apollo, orbital sorties in
the Space Shuttle, and sustained operations in LEO on the ISS – has consisted entirely of short-endurance
missions. Crews have always had the option to abort and return to Earth within a few days at most,
and long-duration operations have been supported by resupply flights every few months. As a result, past
missions have been able to reduce risks with an Earth-dependent support structure. This option will not
be available for future missions, which will take humans farther from Earth than ever before, beyond the
reach of timely abort or resupply options in the event of an emergency. In addition, these missions will
have endurances significantly longer than previous experience. For example, the Evolvable Mars Campaign
(EMC) DSH must be designed to support the crew for 1,100 days in deep space on a Mars transit mission
(round trip, including time in Mars orbit as a safe haven);15 this is an endurance approximately 12 times
longer than the typical resupply interval for the ISS. New approaches must be developed and implemented
to mitigate risk and enable Earth-independent human spaceflight.1–4
Figure 1. Ratio of MTBF to mission endurance required to achieve a given POS, for a total number of units n ranging
from 1 (i.e. single string) to 5 (i.e. 4 standby redundant units in addition to the initial unit). Note that both the
x- and y-axes are plotted on a logarithmic scale. These results assume that all repairs are completed successfully and
there are no manufacturing defects, environmental effects, or unanticipated interactions.
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Table 1. MTBF required to reduce probability of failure to less than 1 in 1000 with a given number of units, both as a
ratio to endurance and as the value required for a 1,100 day Mars transit mission. The MTBF growth factor required
to achieve the same probability of failure with 1 fewer units is also indicated. These values assume that all repairs are
completed successfully and there are no manufacturing defects, environmental effects, or unanticipated interactions.
N
MTBF/Endurance
Ratio
MTBF Required for
Mars Transit [hrs]
MTBF Growth Factor
To Reduce N by 1
1 999.5 26,386,800 N/A
2 22.0 580,800 45.43
3 5.2 137,280 4.23
4 2.3 60,720 2.26
5 1.4 36,960 1.64
Longer missions increase the probability that failures will occur, even for components with very low
failure rates.7,8 As a result, the MTBF required to achieve a high POS for a long-endurance mission grows
quickly. Figure 1 shows the ratio of MTBF to mission endurance required to achieve a desired POS level
for various levels of redundancy or spares, using equation 2. When only one unit is provided, the MTBF
must be approximately 9.5 times greater than the mission endurance in order to achieve a POS of 0.9, which
for critical systems corresponds to a P(LoC) of 1 in 10. For a POS of 0.99 or 0.999, the MTBF must be
approximately 99.5 or 999.5, respectively. Put another way: to reduce the probability of failure on a 1,100
day Mars transit mission to less than 1 in 1000,a the MTBF for a single-string system would have to be
greater than 3,000 years.
Critical systems for long-endurance missions such as these must take into account the fact that, for any
reasonable MTBF value, failures will most likely occur. Therefore, systems should be designed to recover
from failures, either by incorporating redundant elements or spare parts and a maintenance capability.7,8
As shown in figure 1, the addition of redundancy or spares can significantly reduce the required ratio of
MTBF to mission endurance. For the purposes of this paper, the term “spare” will be used to refer to
any item beyond the initial unit, whether that item is incorporated directly into the system as a redundant
unit or requires a maintenance action to replace the previous unit. From a reliability perspective, for a
first-order analysis where repair time impacts (e.g system downtime, crew time requirements) are neglected,
spares and redundancy are functionally nearly equivalent. Table 1 lists the ratios required for various values
of n, as well as the corresponding MTBF (in hours) for a Mars transit mission. The addition of a single
redundant unit reduces the MTBF requirement to just over 66 years. Each additional unit added reduces
the MTBF requirement further; when five units are available (one initial unit plus 4 redundant units), the
MTBF requirement is just over 4.2 years. Note, however, that these values are optimistic, and do not
include other factors that could impact system reliability, such as manufacturing defects, environmental
effects, unanticipated interactions.
Table 1 also indicates the impact of increased reliability the the number of units that must be carried
to achieve the same level of risk. Starting from n = 5 (an MTBF requirement of 36,960 hours), the MTBF
must increase by a factor of 1.64. The next jump is a higher ratio; to reduce from 4 units to 3, the MTBF
must increase by an additional factor of 2.26. This factor continues to increase exponentially as n decreases.
In the context of maintenance logistics planning, this simple, single-item example shows that each additional
spare saved by increasing reliability requires significantly more reliability growth than the previous one. The
impact of reliability growth in more complex, multi-item scenarios is investigated in section IV, and this
trend of diminishing returns is also seen in that situation.
The results of this single-item case illustrate the challenge of maintaining systems on long-endurance mis-
sions. Unreasonably high MTBFs would be required to provide a high probability of no failures occurring, so
failures must be expected and accounted for with additional spares. To achieve a high probability of success,
a mission must increase the MTBF of critical components, carry additional spares or other maintenance
capability, or (most likely) some combination of the two. The amount of reliability increase required to de-
crease the number of spares required grows exponentially, and therefore in terms of logistics mass reduction
produces diminishing returns. Decisions regarding reliability growth efforts must weigh the cost of increasing
aThis baseline POS of 0.999 is selected to represent a notional target for maintenance logistics contribution to P(LoC) of
10−3; note that, as discussed in subsection A, a mission that achieves this POS will have a P(LoC) greater than 10−3. This
relationship between POS and P(LoC) is discussed in greater detail in other papers.13,14
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reliability against the cost of carrying an additional spare, along with all other risks that are not captured
by equation 2. Section III examines the time and financial costs associated with increasing reliability, and
section IV examines the impacts in terms of in order to inform this trade.
III. Costs of Reliability Growth
Several models of varying complexity exist to forecast the time and cost required to increase a system’s
reliability. The Department of Defense (DoD) Reliability Growth Management Handbook (MIL-HDBK-
189C)6 presents an overview of major models used for reliability growth planning and a discussion of key
concepts. Most models focus primarily on the relationship between testing time and achieved reliability for
a reliability growth program, which would then be used to inform program planning and cost assessments
based on the cost of test time. Other models directly examine financial cost associated with reliability
growth. Both time and financial cost considerations are discussed below.
A. Test Time
Most reliability growth models are based on the observation by Duane16 in the early 1960s that, when
plotted on a log-log graph for a variety of different systems, the cumulative average failure rate C(t) (defined
as the number of failures N(t) observed up to time t divided by t) forms a straight line with negative slope.16
This slope, α, is known as the reliability growth rate (or shape parameter), and an additional parameter γ
is the scale parameter, or initial failure rate.b This result indicated that the cumulative failure rate at some
future time could be forecast using a power law:6,16–18
C(t)=γt−α (3)
The instantaneous failure rate ρ(t) (i.e. the current failure rate at time t) is the rate of change in N(t) per
unit time:16–18
ρ(t)=γ(1− α)t−α (4)
The reciprocal of equation 3 or 4 provides the cumulative or instantaneous MTBF, respectively. This learning
curve model for reliability growth is known as the Duane Postulate.6,17
Other, more complex models have also been developed. For example, Crow19 expanded upon the Duane
model to implement it within a statistical framework, modeling failures as a Non-Homogeneous Poisson Pro-
cess (NHPP) with a Weibull intensity function. The resulting model, the Army Materiel Systems Analysis
Activity (AMSAA) Crow Planning Model (also known as the Crow AMSAA model or the AMSAA model)
enables examination of reliability growth over multiple test phases as well as more advanced statistical anal-
ysis and monitoring of reliability growth processes.17,19 Under this model, MTBF growth can be expressed
based on the growth rate α and an initial MTBF, MTBF1, observed over some initial test period t1:
6
MTBF (t) =
MTBF1 0 ≤ t ≤ t1MTBF1 ( tt1)α (1− α)−1 t > t1 (5)
The key parameter in modeling reliability growth is the growth rate α. MIL-HDBK-189C6 presents a
table of historical estimates, noting that for time or distance based systems (as opposed to one-shot systems,
like missiles) the growth rate estimates range from 0.23 to 0.53, with a mean of 0.34 and a median of 0.32.6
Crow17 also reports actual growth rates for various military systems, with an overall average growth rate of
0.40. However, when one-shot systems are removed, the average growth rate for the remaining 6 time-based
systems is 0.36, a relatively close match to the estimates provided by MIL-HDBK-189C.17 This growth factor
– along with the maximum reliability increase that can be achieved (discussed below) – is dependent upon
a wide variety of technical and management characteristics of a particular program, including:6,17
bNote that while Duane,16 Crow,17 and MIL-HDBK-189C6 use the symbol λ to represent the scale parameter, this paper
follows the convention of the 1981 MIL-HDBK-18918 and uses γ in order to avoid confusion with generic failure rate λ.
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Figure 2. Idealized reliability growth curve, showing normalized MTBF as a function of normalized test time. Curves
are shown for the three mean and median growth rates identified by MIL-HDBK-189C6 and Crow.17
• the rate of failure mode discovery (which depends upon the failure rate of that particular mode),
• the time required to assess failure modes and implement corrective actions,
• the Management Strategy (MS), defined as the portion of the initial failure rate that will be addressed
by corrective action if observed during testing, and
• the Fix Effectiveness Factor (FEF), which gives the amount of reduction in failure rate resulting from
a corrective action for a particular failure mode.
Figure 2 shows the idealized reliability growth planning curve, using normalized time and MTBF, based on
5. Curves are shown for the three growth rates described above (MIL-HDBK-189C6 mean and median and
Crow17 mean). Increased growth rate does result in a faster increase in MTBF, but in all cases the learning
curve effect is apparent. Additional testing time to increase MTBF produces diminishing returns.
It is important to note that the reliability growth curves described by equation 5 and shown in figure 2
are idealized. Other factors strongly influence the maximum reliability that can be achieved and the rate at
which it is achieved. For example, the last two factors that influence the growth rate, MS and FEF, also
enable the calculation of the reliability growth potential MTBFGP , or the theoretical upper limit to the
MTBF that can be achieved6
MTBFGP=
MTBF1
1−MS(FEF ) (6)
where FEF is the average FEF across all corrected failure modes. As equation 6 indicates, the higher
the proportion of failure modes that are fixed (MS) and the higher the reduction in failure rate for that
mode resulting from that fix (FEF), the higher the growth potential. Crow17 and the DoD6 note that MS is
typically around 0.95, and MIL-HDBK-189C6 also points out that it is “not prudent” to plan for an MS higher
than 0.96 for developmental portions of systems.6,17 MIL-HDBK-189C6 also presents a table of historical
FEFs; values range from 0.55 to 0.85, with a mean of 0.70 and median of 0.71.6 Crow17 recommends a FEF
of 0.7.17
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MTBFGP is a theoretical limit that is approached by systems as failure modes are identified and cor-
rected; it is typically not achieved, and a margin of 0.6 to 0.8 is typically applied to MTBFGP to obtain
the goal MTBF, MTBFG. Historically, the ratio of the initial MTBF to the MTBF of the matured system
ranges from 0.15 to 0.47, with a mean of 0.30 and a median of 0.27.6 Put another way, MTBF increases in
reliability growth programs have ranged from a factor of approximately 6.7 to 2.1, and the median growth
factor has been approximately 3.7.
It is important to bear in mind that additional test time alone does not improve reliability. Observa-
tion without alteration can enable a reduction of uncertainty around the reliability actually achieved by
a system in its current state – which can be an extremely valuable process in itself, given the impact of
MTBF uncertainty on maintenance logistics and risk20 – but in order to change (and hopefully improve) the
MTBF of a system, design or operational process alterations need to be implemented. Reliability growth
is a process that requires the allocation of resources (both time and money) to perform tests, characterize
failures and identify new failure modes, assess the system in order to determine how failure modes could be
mitigated or have their rates reduced, and implement design or operational changes.6 In this context, the
slowing of reliability growth as test time increases makes sense: systems with high reliability fail less often,
meaning that more test time is required to identify failure modes. In general, the reliability growth models
assessed here indicate that the investment of time into reliability improvement produces diminishing returns
(sublinear growth) in terms of increase in MTBF; put another way, the amount of testing time required
grows superlinearly MTBFs are sought. Mathematically, for a growth rate α between 0 and 1:
MTBF Growth ∝ (Test Time)α (7)
Test Time ∝ (MTBF Growth) 1α (8)
B. Financial Cost
The financial cost of increasing reliability – including test time considerations described above as well as
other costs, such as the cost of the redesign itself – has been described as having four key characteristics:21
1. The cost of low reliability components is very low.
2. The cost of high reliability components is very high.
3. Cost is a monotonically increasing function of reliability.
4. The derivative of cost with respect to reliability is a monotonically increasing function of reliability.
Mettas5 proposed an exponential model for cost c as a function of reliability R that fits these requirements:5
c = e(1−f)
R−Rmin
Rmax−R (9)
where f is the “feasibility” of increasing the component’s reliability (taking a value between 0 and 1, with
lower values indicating that it is more difficult to increase reliability), Rmin is the initial reliability (or
minimum reliability, assuming reliability only improves), and Rmax is the maximum achievable reliability. f
and Rmax depend upon the particular component for which reliability is to be improved, and the value of
these parameters has a significant impact on the shape and value of the cost curve. However, in all cases
the behavior is the same: cost grows exponentially with reliability. This cost model is not meant to directly
capture financial costs, but instead to be used as a generic cost function for optimization and trade studies.5
Agte et al.7 compared the model presented in equation 9 to results from a study conducted at the
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in 2009 to examine the relationship between MTBF and cost for lunar
habitat avionics.c Their comparison found that equation 9 closely with the Draper results at various levels
of complexity, including large units (f = 0.3), medium units (f = 0.2), and small units (f = 0.1).7
While these models do not relate cost directly to MTBF growth as clearly as was done for testing time,
they do indicate trends clearly. The cost of increasing the MTBF of large, complex items is lower than the
cThe Draper study itself is an internal contract report,22 and as of the writing of this paper the authors have not been able
to access it directly. As a result, all descriptions presented here are based on descriptions by Agte et al.7
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cost for simpler items; however, this relationship likely stems from the trend that simpler items are more
reliable in the first place. Complex items may have “low hanging fruit” failure modes that can be identified
and mitigated relatively easily. In general, cost grows exponentially with increased MTBF; mathematically:
Cost ∝ e(MTBF Growth) (10)
IV. Reliability Impacts on Logistics and Risk
The illustrative example presented in figure 1 and table 1 examined the impact of increased reliability for
a single-component system. This section examines the impact of variation in reliability on the maintenance
logistics mass required for a DSH on a 1,100 day Mars transit mission.15 Component MTBFs are varied to
represent both an increase and a decrease in reliability for some or all of the DSH critical system repairable
items. Variation in reliability is implemented by multiplying the nominal MTBFs by an MTBF multiplier,
η). Two analyses are performed in order to understand the impact of reliability impact on logistics mass
and risk. First, the mass required to achieve a POS of 0.999 is calculated as a percentage of the mass in the
baseline case (i.e. MTBFs at their current values) when η is varied between 0.5 and 10. Second, the POS
achieved by the optimal manifest is examined when η is varied between 0.1 and 1 in order to examine the
impact of reliability underperformance. In each analysis, three cases are examined in which η is applied to:
1. The top 10 components, in terms of contribution to corrective maintenance logistics mass
2. The top 25 components, in terms of contribution to corrective maintenance logistics mass
3. All components
For this analysis, only corrective maintenance logistics is considered – that is, spares carried in order to cover
random failures. Spares required for scheduled replacement of life-limited items are not included.
A. Maintenance Logistics Model Description
For this analysis, the demand for each individual type of spare is calculated using a Poisson distribution.
It is assumed that all failures are independent, all repairs are completed successfully, and the impact of
system downtime is negligible. The individual POS for each item is given by the CDF of the Poisson
distribution (equation 2) as a function of that item’s failure rate and the number of spares provided. The
overall POS is the product of these individual item POSs. A manifest optimizer is implemented to determine
the combination of spare parts that achieves an overall POS greater than 0.999 for a minimum spares mass;
this optimizer uses a branch-and-bound discrete optimization approach,11,23 and accounts for scheduled
maintenance by setting a lower bound on the number of spares that can be provided for a life-limited
component. A more detailed description of this modeling approach is presented by Owens and de Weck.13 A
key difference in this application is that after the optimization is complete any spares that were allocated for
scheduled maintenance are removed in order to isolate the maintenance logistics mass required for corrective
maintenance.
Note that this analysis assumes that each item’s MTBF is deterministically known – that is, that there
is no epistemic uncertainty. However, in application failure rate estimates still have a certain degree of un-
certainty around them. This epistemic uncertainty can be captured in the form of a probability distribution,
such as a lognormal distribution.24 As new data become available via tests and operations, this distribution
can be updated in a Bayesian process, such as the process implemented on the ISS.25,26 However, significant
amounts of test time and observations may be required, and the sample size of evidence gleaned from ISS
experience and ground testing may not be sufficient to completely reduce this uncertainty, especially for
complex systems such as the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) system.27 This uncertainty
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, but the impact of MTBF uncertainty on the relationship between
mass and risk for deep space missions is discussed in detail by Stromgren et al.20
9 of 16
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Figure 3. Impact of variations in MTBF on the mass required for corrective maintenance when the multiplier η is
applied to the MTBF for all items (yellow) or the top 25 (red) or top 10 (blue) contributors to corrective maintenance
mass.
Figure 4. Impact of variations in MTBF on the POS achieved by the optimal manifest when the multiplier η is applied
to the MTBF for all items (yellow) or the top 25 (red) or top 10 (blue) contributors to corrective maintenance mass.
Note that the y-axis is plotted on a logarithmic scale.
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B. Results and Discussion
Figure 3 shows the impact of changes in MTBF on the spares mass required for corrective maintenance.
In the baseline case (η = 1), the mass of spares required for corrective maintenance is 10,089kg.d When
the MTBF of all components is doubled, the corrective maintenance mass is reduced to approximately 76%
of its initial value. Continued increase in MTBF reduces mass further, and when all MTBFs are ten times
higher than their baseline values the corrective maintenance mass is just under 45% of its initial value. When
only the top 25 contributors to corrective maintenance mass are altered, the mass percentages at η = 2 and
η = 10 are 85% and 65%, respectively. When only the top 10 components experience increased MTBF,
the corresponding values are 91% and 80%, respectively. Overall, increasing MTBF can decrease the mass
required for corrective maintenance, but it produces diminishing returns. In addition, MTBF increase is
most effective if it is applied to all components. When the number of components for which MTBF improves
is reduced, the impact of improved reliability (in terms of logistics mass reduction) is also reduced.
Figure 3 also shows the impact of reduced MTBF. Corrective maintenance mass requirements grow much
more quickly when MTBF decreases than they are reduced when MTBF increases, but again the magnitude
of the impact is proportional to the number of components that experience a change in reliability. For
example, the mass percentage when η = 0.5 is applied to all components is 135%; that is, mass increased
by 35%. To achieve a 35% decrease in corrective maintenance mass, MTBF must increase by more than
a factor of three. For the top 25 and top 10 cases, the mass percentages at η = 0.5 are 121% and 112%,
respectively. These results illustrate the asymmetric nature of MTBF variation: decreased MTBF is more
detrimental than increased MTBF is helpful.
Figure 4 explores this asymmetry further by examining the impact of η on the POS achieved by the
optimal manifest from the baseline case. When MTBFs increase, POS also increases, though the amount of
increase is limited by the number of components that experience higher MTBFs. Whereas a 50% increase in
MTBF for all components raises the POS from 0.999 to 0.9998, if only the top 25 contributors to corrective
maintenance mass are affected the resultant POS is 0.9995, and if only the top 10 items are affected the
POS is just under 0.9993. Decreases in component reliability have a much more significant impact on system
POS. An order of magnitude reduction in POS occurs when η is 0.61, 0.55, or 0.51, for the cases where all
components, the top 25 components, and the top 10 components are affected, respectively. As η decreases,
POS continues to decrease as well; the corresponding η values for a two order of magnitude reduction in
POS are 0.38, 0.34, and 0.30, respectively. In addition, while reductions in POS are more significant when
a greater number of components are affected, this effect is not as strong. Underperformance in reliability
in even a small number of components can significantly impact the overall system POS. This makes sense,
since system POS is the product of constituent item POSs, all of which are between 0 and 1; the lowest
item-level POS sets an upper bound on the POS that can be achieved by the system.
It is important to note that figure 3 examines only the change in mass associated with corrective main-
tenance. This does not include mass for emplaced systems, consumables, or scheduled maintenance. These
mass categories cannot be reduced by increasing MTBFs, since they are not dependent upon component
reliabilities but rather more deterministic parameters such as the mass of components themselves, consum-
ables consumption and recycling rates, and component life limits. As a result, the percent mass reductions
indicated above do not correspond to total reductions in logistics mass, only reductions in one category of
mass. The impact of MTBF on total mission mass requirements will be less than the results shown in figure
3.
In general, the benefits of increased MTBF (in terms of logistics mass saved from the baseline value)
grow sublinearly; increased reliability produces diminishing returns. Mathematically, for an arbitrary mass
savings growth rate β between 0 and 1 (unrelated to the reliability growth rate α):
Logistics Mass Saved ∝ (MTBF Growth)β (11)
The mass savings growth rate depends upon the number of units that experience MTBF improvements, as
well as other factors such as the endurance of the mission, the POS requirement, and the particular set
of equipment that is being spared for. This analysis showed that logistics mass savings grow fastest when
all components experience reliability improvements, and the rate decreases as the fewer components are
improved.
dNote that this value assumes that all MTBFs are deterministically known. When uncertainty is accounted for, this value
will be higher. See Stromgren et al.20 and Owens and de Weck14 for an analysis of the impact of uncertainty.
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V. Discussion
A. Assessment of Cost and Benefit Trends
Figure 5. Trends in test time requirements
(top), cost (center), and maintenance logis-
tics mass savings (bottom) as MTBF increases.
These curves are for illustrative purposes only,
based on the relationships defined in equations
12, 13, and 14, and do not represent exact re-
sults.
The results presented above are not meant to represent an
exact prediction of what the time, cost, and mass reduction
potential of increased MTBF are, but rather an examination
of how those values trend as effort is put into increasing reli-
ability. These trends are captured in equations 8, 10, and 11,
summarized below:
Test Time ∝ (MTBF Growth) 1α (12)
Cost ∝ e(MTBF Growth) (13)
Logistics Mass Saved ∝ (MTBF Growth)β (14)
where α and β are both constants between 0 and 1 that depend
upon the characteristics of the system and mission at hand.
These trends are presented graphically in figure 5. In general,
time and cost grow as MTBF increases, with time growing
superlinearly and cost growing exponentially. Meanwhile, the
benefits of increased MTBF grow sublinearly; this agrees with
the simple example shown in table 1, where the MTBF growth
required to reduce the number of spares required increases with
each additional reduction in spares.
These trends indicate that the cost (in terms of finances and
test time required) of decreasing corrective maintenance logis-
tics mass grows significantly and produces diminishing returns.
In early stages, as “low-hanging fruit” are addressed and the
easiest fixes to improve reliability are implemented, logistics
mass requirements can be reduced for relatively low cost and
test time. However, further efforts to increase MTBF will have less of an effect on system mass and will
incur significantly more cost and test time. As noted in section II, future long-endurance missions would
require unreasonably high MTBFs to provide a high probability that no failures will occur, and that therefore
spares will have to be carried. The number of spares required can be reduced by increasing MTBFs, but
high reliability will be expensive to attain, require a significant amount of test time, and have a diminishing
effect on overall maintenance logistics mass requirements.
B. Other Considerations
This analysis focused primarily on the benefits of reliability growth in terms of reduction in logistics
mass requirements. However, there are other mission aspects that reliability might impact which should
also be examined. For example, component MTBFs impact the number of failures that will occur during
the mission; more reliable components fail less often, thus reducing demand for maintenance actions by the
crew. This could reduce the crew time required for maintenance, as well as potentially reduce the risk of
human error during maintenance (assuming that the probability of an incorrect maintenance action is not
dependent upon the number of times the crew must execute that action, which may not be the case). This
reduction in crew time required for maintenance would enable more crew time to be used for utilization,
thus increasing the productivity and scientific value of missions. These considerations should also be weighed
against the cost, test time, and mass reduction considerations discussed above.
The analysis presented in section IV examined only the spares mass required to cover anticipated failures.
Each particular failure has aleatoric uncertainty surrounding it due to the inherently stochastic component
failure process (characterized by the MTBF), and the corrective maintenance mass results presented in figure
3 represent the mass required to achieve the POS target when taking into account this aleatoric uncertainty.
However, there may still be epistemic uncertainty present in terms of uncertainty in the MTBF values
themselves. This uncertainty can significantly increase the amount of mass that must be carried to have a
high confidence that sufficient spares are provided (see Stromgren et al.20 for a more in-depth examination
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of this effect). As a result, when considering test time requirements for reliability growth, it is important
to consider not only the test time required to identify and mitigate failure modes (i.e. improve reliability)
but also the test time required to reduce uncertainty around the actual MTBF value. In addition, this
analysis did not include common cause failures such as manufacturing defects, human error, or environmental
effects. Operational experience on the ISS has shown that unanticipated issues continue to appear in human
spaceflight,12 even after years of testing and operations. These unanticipated issues will most likely continue
to appear in future missions, especially when new environments are encountered for the first time. Common
cause failures can significantly limit the risk coverage provided by spare parts and redundancy, since a
common failure mode that causes an unexpectedly low reliability in a particular component is likely to
also decrease the reliability of all of its spares.28 This highlights the importance of testing in a relevant
environment, since – as noted in section II – reliability characterizes a component’s ability to function for a
given period of time within a given set of conditions.6 If the actual operating conditions are different from
the test conditions used to assess reliability, reliability estimates may be significantly different from actual
values.
C. Other Approaches To Maintenance Logistics Mass Reduction
Increasing reliability is not the only option to decrease maintenance logistics mass. This section gives a
brief overview of other potential solutions that could be implemented.
1. Direct Mass Reduction
The simple example examined in section II indicated that for long-endurance missions it is likely that
several spares may need to be carried for each item in order to achieve high POS. While increasing MTBF
may allow the number of required spares to be reduced, it may be more effective to invest resources into
directly reducing the mass of each spare. The number of spares required for each item is then a multiplier
on the total logistics mass saved. In addition, mass reduction is less expensive and time consuming to verify
than increased MTBF since it is a deterministic value rather than a characteristic of a stochastic process.
2. Lower-Level Repair
The analysis presented in section IV was based on an equipment list that consisted mainly of Orbital
Replacement Units (ORUs), with some smaller components. ORUs are designed to simplify maintenance
procedures in order to reduce crew time requirements for maintenance on the ISS. This is accomplished by
packaging components and assemblies into easy-to-remove modules. However, this strategy for maintenance
results in inefficient sparing, since good components are discarded when a failed ORU is replaced. A lower
level of repair can enable more targeted maintenance that replaces only the component that has failed, thus
reducing maintenance logistics mass requirements.13
3. Parts Count Reduction and Commonality
One of the major drivers of maintenance logistics mass requirements is the fact that many different types
of items need to be spared for, and that typically a single spare can only cover one type of failure mode.
As a result, even though the expected number of spares that will actually be used is very small, there is no
way to know a priori which particular spare will be required. For example, a logistics analysis by Cirillo et
al.2 estimated that, for the ISS, approximately 95% of the spares carried for corrective maintenance would
not be used. This uncertainty means that a large number of spares need to be carried in order to achieve
POS targets. A reduction in the number of different types of parts that have to be spared for – either by
simplifying system design, incorporating commonality, or both – can help reduce logistics requirements by
mitigating these impacts. Commonality in particular is a very valuable approach, since it enables a single
type of spare to cover several different types of failures, rather than just one.2
4. In-Space Manufacturing
The logistics challenges of future missions are unlike any that have been experienced in human spaceflight
to date, and they may require entirely new approaches to maintenance logistics. ISM is a new technology
that has the potential to significantly reduce maintenance logistics mass and mitigate risk on long-endurance
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missions.14,29 ISM enables the creation of spare parts on demand from a common stock of raw materials,
enabling flexibility in maintenance logistics that is not provided by a traditional spares approach. This
capability enables the mass reduction benefits of commonality without forcing different components to have
common design (which might otherwise have a detrimental impact on system performance). The flexibility
provided by ISM also enables adaptable systems that can respond to unanticipated circumstances and
mitigate the detrimental impacts of epistemic uncertainty in MTBF values. In addition, ISM enables the use
of recycled or in-situ materials, opening the possibility of “closed-loop” maintenance logistics. Application
of loop closure and In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) have significantly reduced the logistics requirements
associated with other spacecraft systems such as ECLS and propulsion, and an extension of this capability to
maintenance logistics could also result in significant mass reduction. A more in-depth analysis and discussion
of ISM applications and impacts is presented by Owens and de Weck.14
5. All of the Above (and More)
There is likely no single solution to the maintenance logistics challenges of long-endurance spaceflight.
Instead, system development should examine combinations of possible solutions, balancing the costs and
benefits of each against each other in order to reduce logistics mass and mitigate risk without incurring
excessive development costs or test time requirements. The Lower Bounding Principle of Optimization
states that when the design space is expanded, new solutions will be found that are at least as good, if
not better, than solutions from the more constrained case.30 Therefore, trade studies and optimization
that remove as many artificial constraints as possible are likely to generate better solutions than design
processes that fix or eliminate some options a priori. In the context of the maintenance logistics challenges
examined here, these artificial constraints on the design space may be a fixed level of repair, fixed MTBFs,
the assumption of no manufacturing capability, or inflexible part counts and commonality definitions. For
example, Agte8 and Agte et al.7 showed that when both physical design variables and component failure
rates are allowed to vary during optimization of long-endurance aircraft, better solutions can be generated
than the case where either design variables or failure rates are varied while the other is fixed.7,8 Designers of
future long-endurance crewed spacecraft should take advantage of all options available to them, examining
the impact of each individual strategy as well as combinations of different approaches, in order to reduce
maintenance logistics requirements and risk.
VI. Conclusion
This paper examined the costs and benefits associated with increasing MTBF for long-endurance human
spaceflight missions. Trends in test time, cost and logistics mass reduction resulting from increased MTBF
were assessed via a review of reliability growth models found in the literature and an analysis of corrective
maintenance logistics requirements for DSH critical systems on a Mars transit mission. In general, test
time grows superlinearly, cost grows exponentially, and mass savings grow sublinearly as efforts are made to
increase MTBF. Therefore, it seems unlikely that investment in reliability growth alone is a cost-effective
approach to reducing maintenance logistics requirements and mitigating risk for long-endurance missions.
Other potential strategies for logistics mass reduction were also discussed, including direct reduction of
component mass, lower-level repair, simplification and commonality, and ISM.
These results are not meant to imply that reliability growth should not be invested in at all. Increased
reliability is beneficial, and if it can be achieved at a reasonable cost and within a reasonable timeframe
it should be attempted. However, system development and mission planning should carefully weigh the
increasing costs of reliability growth against the diminishing returns that it provides. Reliability growth is
only one option of many to reduce mass. The potential costs and benefits of all logistics reduction strategies
– as well as any others that can be developed – should be examined, both as individual approaches to mass
reduction and in combinations, in order to determine the most effective approach for future missions.
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